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Abstract
This paper focuses on one of the main arguments in 
contemporary Anglo-American legal circles: what is the 
essence of legal theory? This paper is divided into three 
parts: the first part combs the methodology approach 
of descriptive method theory, represented by Hart, Raz 
and, more recently, Julie Dickson, and sums up its three 
important propositions; the second part summarizes the 
criticism of the descriptive theory by non-positivism 
scholars such as Dworkin, Finnis and Stephen Perry; in 
the third part I put forward my conclusion on the basis of 
the first two parts: the theory of descriptive law is not a 
successful legal theory, which should be a theory based on 
descriptive and normative methodology.
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INTRODUCTION
“What is the law?” It is the core problem of jurisprudence 
or legal theory1, which is always debated by the schools 
of natural law, positivism and so on. Since the publication 
of the second edition of H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of 
Law in 1994, the field of vision of contemporary Anglo-
American jurisprudence had expanded from “what is law” 
to “what is the essence of jurisprudence or legal theory”.2 
The substantive controversy of the legal theory is that of 
“what is the essence of jurisprudence or legal theory?”, or 
“Is there an inevitable link between law and morality?”. 
The methodology dispute of legal theory argues whether 
there is an inevitable connection between law theory and 
morality. Accordingly, legal positivism can be classified 
as substantive positivism and methodological positivism: 
the former insists that there is no inevitable connection 
between law and morality, while the latter maintains that 
legal theory can and should provide a neutral description 
of law. Substantive positivism mainly consists of 
separation proposition and social fact proposition. At 
the methodological level, the focus is no longer “what is 
law”, but instead focuses on the legal theory itself, mainly 
involving the nature and task of the legal theory. Generally 
speaking, the two are closely related and correspond to 
1 This paper does not intend to sedulously distinguish between 
jurisprudence and legal theory. For the distinction and connection 
between the two categories, see Professor Chen Jinghui's article, 
"Why is the Legal theory important-the knowledge Framework of 
Law and the position of Jurisprudence in it", Law Science, No. 3, 
2014, pp. 66-67. Professor Chen Jinghui pointed out the difference 
and connection between jurisprudence, legal theory and philosophy 
of law: philosophy of law is the narrowest of the three concepts 
and is used to refer to "second-order theory", which is a relatively 
philosophical field; There is no substantial difference between 
jurisprudence and law theory. They both include normative theory 
and philosophy of law as second-order theory. But because the word 
"Jurisprudence" sometimes be used equal to "Legal science" in the 
most general sense, in addition, "Jurisprudence" would also be used 
in the “Medical Jurisprudence” and “Equity Jurisprudence” and so 
on, then the meaning of the word "Legal theory" is relatively clear.
2 See Wang Zanrong, From legal Standardization to Jurisprudence 
Methodology, Yuanzhao Publishing House, Taiwan, Dec. 2013. 
Zhuang Shitong distinguished the dispute of the legal theory into 
two categories: “substantive controversy” and “methodological 
controversy”, the former is concerned with “what is the nature of 
law”, the latter is concerned with “what is the nature of the legal 
theory”? Zhuang Shitong: “Is descriptive Law Theory possible?-A 
critical reflection”, Review of Politics and Social philosophy, June 
21, 2007, p. 36.
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each other (Perry, 2001, p.331). Both Hart and Joseph Raz 
are substantial positivist and methodological positivists, 
who hold that the substantive law can be fully explained; 
John Finnis, Ronald Dworkin and others opposed the 
positivism approach of Hart and Raz, insisted on the 
approach of normative methodology and hermeneutics 
methodology, and considered that the legal theory cannot 
be separated from the moral evaluation.
1 . T H E  P O S I T I O N  A N D  M E T H O D 
APPROACH OF DESCRIPTIVE LEGAL 
THEORY 
1.1 Hart: the “Internal View” of “External 
Observer”
The descriptive legal theory was first put forward by 
Hart. In the preface to The Concept of Law, Hart pointed 
out that this book can also be regarded as an attempt to 
describe the sociological (descriptive sociology). In the 
postscript, he made a clear and concise summary: this 
book provides a theory of what the law is, which is both 
general and descriptive; “described” means “morally 
neutral and without legitimate objectives” (Hart. 2011, p. 
209).
Hart’s methodological path stemmed fundamentally 
from the distinction between the law of reality and the 
law of nature (the same as the distinction between is/
ought) made by analytical jurisprudence, starting with 
Bentham and Austin. Bentham has put forward two kinds 
of distinctions about the study of jurisprudence: one is the 
expository jurisprudence, that is the study of the de facto 
existence of the law, the purpose of which is to illustrate 
the universal characteristics of positive law; Second is the 
censorial jurisprudence, of which is to put forward moral 
examination of positive law as the basis of law reform. 
As a successor to Bentham’s thought, Austin pointed out 
more clearly: “the existence of law is one thing, and its 
advantages and disadvantages are another. Whether the 
law exists or not is another question. “(Austin, 2001, p.5).
The most important reason for Hart’s criticism of 
Austin’s order theory is that it fails to explain the real 
legal practice and reveal the unique characteristics of 
legal operation. From the reflective and critical attitude 
of actors towards rules and violations, he realized that 
participants would take an internal view of rules and 
further analyzed that the internal aspect of rules was the 
essential attribute of law (Zhuang, 2007, p.36). The task 
of Hart’s legal theory is to explain the concept of law and 
the essential characteristics of descriptive method in a 
way that does not involve moral evaluation. According to 
descriptive methodology, legal theory aims to “provide 
a more accurate analysis of the unique structure of the 
domestic legal system and a better understanding of 
the similarities and differences between the three social 
phenomena of law, coercion and morality,” To promote 
the development of legal theory “ (Hart, 2011, p.209).
In Hart’s opinion, there is nothing in the plan of 
descriptive jurisprudence to prevent non-participant 
external observers from describing the way participants 
view the law from this internal perspective. It is for 
this reason that he explained in detail that participants 
express their internal views by accepting the law as 
guidance and criterion of their actions. Of course, the 
legal theorist who describes it does not share participants’ 
acceptance of the law, but he can and should describe 
such acceptance. To this end, the described legal theorist 
must indeed understand what is taking an intrinsic view 
and, in that limited sense, must be able to place himself 
in the position of an internal member; But in doing so, it 
is not necessary to accept, endorse the law, or share the 
internal views of internal members, or in any other way 
renounce its described position (Hart, 2011, p.212). The 
philosophical analysis of the institution of law in different 
country and society can be descriptive, which means that 
the participants in the system must participate in it with 
value. These values are of great relevance to any fruitful 
description. However, this is neither the value of theorists 
engaged in descriptive work nor the need to share them. 
The legal theorists only described or analyzed these 
values, whose true masters are the active participants in 
the legal system.
1.2 Joseph Raz’s “Social Understanding” Thesis
Joseph Raz belongs to the camp of  descript ive 
jurisprudence. Like Hart, he also advocated substantive 
positivism and methodological positivism, which support 
each other. Raz’s substantive positivism is summarized 
as two points: one is the sources thesis and the other is 
the authority thesis. The content of the sources thesis is 
that the common foundation of all positivism is that the 
law has a social source, that is, the content of the law and 
its existence can be determined by reference to the social 
facts, without having to rely on moral evaluation (Chen, 
2006). Raz believed that authority, as a practical concept, 
is a normative power that can change people’s reasons 
for action. Since the law is not a system of isolated norms 
with separate functions, but a system of reasons that 
jointly determine the content of its provisions, presenting 
an authoritative system of standards, and requires that 
all who apply it recognize its authority (Raz, 2005, 
pp.14-28). The authoritative proposition guarantees the 
propositions of origin and describes an essential feature of 
legal practice.
In  methodology,  Raz  advoca ted  descr ip t ive 
construction of legal theory, mainly reflected in his 
theoretical discussion of the concept and nature of 
law, and regards the theory of constructive law as a 
reunderstanding of social understanding of legal practice. 
That is, the self-understanding of our legal practice (Zhu, 
2016). Raz believes that the task of the legal theory is 
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not to study the concept of law as Hart says, nor is it the 
meaning of Dworkin’s inquiry into the law, with the aim 
of explaining the law. And in order to promote people’s 
self-understanding. Because law is a social system, a 
social system identified and referred to by the concept of 
law. People have certain attitudes or opinions about the 
law, and the legal theorist, in explaining the law, must 
take into account how people (living in the legal system) 
view the law (Wang, 2013, p.192). Therefore this thesis is 
called as “Social Understanding Thesis” (Zhuang, 2007, 
p.39). Whether the legal theory can properly explain 
these beliefs and attitudes about the law is an important 
judgment in determining whether the legal theory is 
successful or not.
Raz’s legal theory is in communication with the 
view of the sociology of law, but Raz is of the view 
that, although both the law and the sociology of law are 
studying the law as a characteristic of a general social 
system, However, it is different from the law sociology 
to define a specific legal system or a specific type of law 
system, and the law theory tries to put forward a set of 
necessary characteristics for the existence and effect of the 
law. It is the “source proposition” of the “an authoritative 
argument” and the authority of the service to explain the 
authoritative nature of the law.
Although Raz pointed out that the task of law theory 
is to explain the essence of law, he did not abandon the 
important position of conceptual analysis in legal theory. 
“The legal theory explains the essence of law by the 
concept of analytical method” (Zhuang, 2007, p.223). 
Raz thought “even if the elaboration of the concept of law 
involves evaluative or ethical disputes, it is only possible 
after the conceptual dispute has been resolved, that is, 
the concept of law has been clarified,” The point is that 
we must clarify the concept of law based on the shared 
judgment used by the concept before there is a way to go 
further into disputes involving ethical or moral issues.” 
(Zhuang, 2007, p.239).
1.3 Julie Dickson: “Indirect Evaluation” and 
“Direct Evaluation” 
Julie Dickson, Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford 
University, is devoted to the study of jurisprudence 
methodology and meta-theory, the purpose of which is 
to reflect on the method of constructing the legal theory. 
Enhance our understanding of law and the nature of legal 
theory, and defend the descriptive jurisprudence of Hart 
and Raz.
Like Raz, Dickson believed that a successful legal 
theory contains two conditions for legal theses: (1) the 
legal thesis must be true; (2) the thesis can properly 
explain the nature of law. To that end, she asked the 
following question: What is the purpose of the legal theory 
that we are committed to constructing? What criteria will 
be adopted to judge the quality of this theory? What is the 
basis for our choice between competitive jurisprudence 
claims? Is the purpose of the legal theory in terms of 
object a descriptive, critical or evidentiary one? Are these 
different methodological approaches against each other? 
(Dickson, 2001, p.7).
By answering the above questions, Dickson put 
forward an indirect evaluation theory, which negates the 
dual division between traditional descriptive jurisprudence 
and normative jurisprudence. The methodological 
framework, which should be distinguished from the 
reality, has more or less influenced the jurists of later 
generations. This dualism, however, is misleading to 
Dickson, because it leads to the judgment of a legal 
theorist who is engaged in describing “such a law as 
in practice”. In the process of developing this theory, 
she does not need to make any value judgment; on the 
contrary, the legal theorists who took Dworkin’s approach 
refused to allow us to simply describe the law, but to 
necessarily include some moral values, the purpose and 
function of the law (Dickson, 2001, pp.8-9).
T h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  a b o v e  a r e  b a s e d  o n  a n 
oversimplification of the traditional dualism of “is/ought 
“. The dual division is not only useless but also has its 
own problems. Its first difficulty lies in dividing the 
disputors into two methodological camps of “normative 
jurisprudence” and “descriptive jurisprudence”. At the 
same time, it also fails to deal with the difficult and 
complicated meta-theoretical problems properly. Another 
difficulty in this division is the presupposition that the 
fundamental differences between the two camps lie in 
whether the legal theory is value-free or involving value 
judgement (Dickson, 2001, pp.30-31).
Whether the legal theorists advocated by Hart and Raz 
can successfully construct a legal theory without any value 
judgment, or Dworkin and Perry advocate that we will 
not be able to explain the legal theory effectively without 
moral judgment. These two points of view are biased, 
no matter what theory (including the legal theory) must 
pursue some pure post-theoretical value, such as simple, 
clear, accurate, comprehensive and harmonious, and so 
on. Even Hart’s theory of descriptive law is still evaluative 
in this sense, not complete value immunity, but at best 
a relative value exemption. The reason is that it already 
contains a number of post-evaluation factors (Dickson, 
2001, pp.33). Since it is pointed out that some post-
established values must be pursued by any legal theory, 
it can be further deduced that any legal theory is not fully 
exempt from value, but must be a kind of evaluative legal 
theory. Hart’s descriptive jurisprudence is based on an 
indirect evaluation position, while Dworkin’s normative 
jurisprudence is accordingly based on a direct evaluation 
position based on moral evidence. Dickson finally led us 
to abandon the dichotomy between the “descriptive” and 
“normative” legal theory and tried to arrive at the middle 
position (Zhuang, 2007, p. 39).
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2. THE APPROACH TO NORMATIVE 
LEGAL THEORY
2.1 Dworkin’s Hermeneutic Methodology
Hart regarded his conceptual analysis theory as a 
descriptive jurisprudence, but after he died, he drew 
criticism from all sides. Critics are generally sceptical 
about whether legal theory can exist in a purely 
descriptive form. Among them, the most powerful critic 
was Dworkin. Dworkin’s criticism lied not in conceptual 
analysis or philosophical description itself, but in what 
else we need in addition to description. In response, he 
said he simply did not understand what this descriptive 
jurisprudence was about to describe. Law theorists 
must express their own value identity in the process of 
description (Sun, 2013). Shapiro reminds us that it is best 
to see the battle between Hart and Dworkin as a dynamic 
whole, and that Dworkin constantly adjusts the target of 
his criticism to avoid Hart and his followers’ response as 
effectively as possible. On the one hand, it modifies and 
improves one’s own legal theory, on the other hand, it also 
leads the methodological turn in contemporary Anglo-
American jurisprudence (Sun, 2013).
In the book  Law’s Empire,  Dworkin criticized 
the descriptive position of legal positivism from the 
perspective of methodology. On the one hand, he put 
forward a substantive theory about the nature of law in 
order to compete with legal positivism. On the other hand, 
he put forward the legal theory of hermeneutics which can 
subvert descriptive methodology. Dworkin insisted that 
the best understanding of the law or the legal system is 
to adhere to an intrinsic participant’s perspective, which 
inevitably leads to a methodology of “hermeneutics”, 
and then clarifies the internal structure and logic of law 
by resorting to morality. This is similar to Hart’s early 
polemist Lon Fuller, who insisted that the law is the 
existence of some kind of “value bearer”.
According to Shapiro, Dworkin’s criticism of Hart 
can be summed up in the relationship between legitimacy 
and morality. “Dworkin’s basic strategy throughout the 
debate is, in any way, the fundamental strategy,” he said. 
Legitimacy is ultimately determined not only by social 
facts, but by moral facts. In other words, the existence and 
content of positive law ultimately depend on the existence 
and content of moral law. Thus, this view directly 
challenges and threatens the positivism’s description of 
the nature of the law as follows. That is to say, legitimacy 
must not be determined by morality but only by social 
practice (Shapiro, 2016, p.152).
2.2 John Finnis: “Practical Viewpoint” and 
“Focus Meaning”
In the first chapter of his masterpiece Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, Finnis focused on the distinction between 
the legal theory of evaluation and the descriptive legal 
theory. He argued that the description of the law can 
not be separated from the evaluation. “People generally 
think that if we want to engage in a kind of evaluation 
for the law as a social system, it is necessary to describe 
and analyze the value neutral of the system in which the 
facts exist in the first place. However, the development of 
contemporary jurisprudence suggests, and the reflection 
on the methodology of any social science, unless theorists 
themselves are involved in evaluating and understanding 
what is good for humanity and what is needed for 
practical reason, Otherwise, he will not be able to provide 
a theoretical description and analysis of social facts 
(Finnis, 2003, p.3).” It is not difficult to see that what 
Finnis opposed to is not a description of the law, but a 
pure description that is exempt from the moral evaluation.
Finnis questioned the methodology of descriptive 
legal theory on the basis of three arguments. First of all, 
he believed that both Hart’s internal point of view and 
Raz’s transcendent legal view are a “practical view” of 
the “function” of the facts that their theories sought to 
describe, which is the practical reason for giving members 
of society the right to abide by the law. Then he puts 
forward a second argument: descriptive legal theorists 
have the crux of different descriptions of facts that they 
are familiar with each other. It is because they judge which 
facts are important, meaningful, and what are not from 
different practical points of view; Therefore, in the choice 
of the characteristics of legal importance, there must be 
some kind of “focal meaning), which Aristotle calls “focal 
meaning” in the practical view held by descriptive law 
theorists. Only in this way can we distinguish between the 
“central case” and the “marginal case” of the law. Finnis’s 
third argument is that both Hart’s internal view and Raz’s 
transcendent legal view are unstable and unsatisfactory, 
because both of them are based on reasons to maintain 
descriptive positions. They refused to find a central point 
of focus for their practical views, so that the choice of the 
important and meaningful features of the law is unclear, 
and it is impossible to clearly identify the central cases 
and marginal cases of the law (Finnis, 2003, p.12).
It may be possible to understand but not accept 
justifiable reasons and not to describe it in an evaluative 
manner, but what is its value? Finnis pointed out that if 
people were to say something universal about certain 
human affairs, then he would have to identify the concepts 
that better illustrate the situation of human beings. And 
it is more important to identify the alleged reasons for 
action to understand human behavior and opportunities. 
The neutrality or value of Hart’s description is almost 
impossible in epistemology. “the general description 
and interpretation must depend on the shared evaluation 
defined between the author and the reader. By recognizing 
the functions, interests, pleasures, defects and remedies 
of society, Hart rightly made progress in every respect. 
Without resorting to value as a good reason for action, his 
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arguments against the descriptive nature of competition 
and interpretative legal theories are almost impossible to 
begin, let alone success (Zhu, 2012, p.83).” Finnis finally 
emphasized that the description of the concept of law by 
any law theorist cannot avoid the factors of evaluation, 
and it is also necessary to further establish the central 
example of his practical point of view, otherwise it will 
be difficult to identify the important features of the law 
(Finnis, pp.13-16). So for Finnis, the practical point of 
view of the central case is a moral one, and it is a moral 
view based on the rationality of practice.
2.3 Stephen Perry: Another Criticism of What 
Kind of “Internal View”
 Another criticism to the descriptive legal theory came 
from Stephen Perry, however, Perry adopted a critical 
strategy and argumentation that was obviously different 
from that of Dworkin: first, he denied Hart and Raz’s 
descriptive method of explanation, and then pointed to the 
conceptual analysis method of their theory. 
Perry argued that jurisprudence, like other social 
sciences, faces a special methodological challenge: it not 
only wants to portray social practice through descriptive 
methods, but also it is necessary to explain the normative 
orientation of the law that provides prudent justification 
for human behavior. Hart’s answer to this question is 
“internal point of view”, which can effectively explain 
the concept of “obligation”, and it can also be used as 
a critique of the predictive theory of obligation. The 
intrinsic point of view of social rules is that of the 
participants in group practice, and he accepts the rules as 
the criterion of guidance and criticism of behavior; The 
corresponding external view, referring to the point of view 
of the observer of the practice, did not realize the inherent 
aspects of the rule, that is, he accepted the rule not out of 
obligation but in order to evade punishment or sanction. 
Perry points out the inherent tension between “descriptive 
description” and “conceptual analysis” used by Hart’s 
descriptive jurisprudence, so it is necessary to choose 
between them. Descriptive methods are appropriate for 
scientific research, but the most appropriate method for 
jurisprudence, as a branch of practical philosophy, may 
be conceptual analysis. If jurisprudence is regarded as a 
scientific undertaking, so in order to obtain a descriptive 
moral neutral social theory, we must rely on an external 
point of view, which is directly contrary to the internal 
point of view under Hart’s social rule theory. As a result, 
attempts to construct a descriptive jurisprudence through 
a purely descriptive description will eventually prove 
to be nothing more than an alternative version of Hart’s 
criticism of realistic duty forecasting (Perry, 2006, pp. 
129-130).
As far as the methodology of conceptual analysis 
is concerned, Perry thought that the idea of conceptual 
analysis is in fact not valid, and once this proposition 
has been established, Then the descriptive approach 
advocated by positivism law must be the same as the 
normative approach advocated by Dworkin. First of all, 
it is necessary to clarify that the conceptual analysis 
of law is not the concept of law in the daily sense, the 
interpretation and conceptual analysis of the meaning of 
the term, but the analysis of the inevitable attribute of the 
law on a metaphysical level. In other words, it gives a 
philosophical explanation of the normative nature of the 
law. In order to illustrate that the structure of the first rule 
and the second rule constitutes the essence of the legal 
theory and the important argument that the recognition 
of the rule as the cornerstone of the unity of the whole 
system of law, Hart further argues that both the social 
rule and the concept of the internal view associated with 
it make the analysis of the basic concepts of obligation 
and responsibility necessary. When it comes to conceptual 
analysis, what he shows in his mind may be a framework 
of conceptual analysis applied to our social behavior, so 
the method of conceptual analysis in Hart has become the 
only basis for judging whether a law theory is successful 
or not (Sun, 2013).
So we can see the tension between Hart’s method of 
conceptual analysis and his internal point of view. It is 
not possible to draw a convincing conclusion that the 
descriptive approach is possible only through conceptual 
analysis, which has a great explanatory power to the 
social practice, and it is not possible to draw a convincing 
conclusion that the descriptive approach is possible. 
Moreover, if a practitioner is committed to the cause of a 
conceptual analysis, he cannot ignore the present social 
practice, and once so, it will inevitably involve normative 
judgment and moral proof. In the following discussion, 
the question was further transformed into: what kind of 
“internal view” does Hart hold? Dworkin argues that 
judges, lawyers, and jurists must view law, construct 
legal theory, and adjudicate cases from an “intrinsic 
participant” perspective. The position and attitude of the 
internal participant means that the observer must share the 
value and attitude of the participant, which leads to a kind 
of hermeneutic legal theory. The perspective of “external 
observer” only leads to a duty prediction theory similar 
to that of Holmes. Does this mean that legal theorists can 
only choose between “internal participants” and “external 
observers”? Is there a third position that underpins Hart’s 
descriptive jurisprudence?
In fact, the key to the problem is how to recognize 
and look at the internal view. Dworkin’s internal view is 
not exactly the same as Hart’s internal viewpoint. “Hart’s 
version of the ‘internal perspective’ is a practical attitude 
accepted by the rules,” he said. That is, reflective critical 
attitude; The ‘internal perspective’ of the Dworkin version 
is a participant’s perspective. From this we can see that 
Hart took the research path of ‘participatory external 
perspective’, while Dworkin picked up the research path 
of participants’ internal perspective (Wang, 2011).” In 
addition, there are also commentators who argue that this 
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is a kind of “external view” that can be attributed to it. But 
it is a distinctive “non-extreme external view” (Shen, 2010, 
p.35). In essence, Hart’s position of “participating but not 
sharing” is described by Raz as a “transcendent internal 
view”. It transcends “extreme internal view” and “extreme 
external view”, but is a special position between them. 
Hart claims that his own internal view is different 
from Dworkin’s version of “strong internalism,” in 
which theorists do not share participants’ values, beliefs, 
and attitudes. Perry believes that Hart itself misused 
the concept of internal view in criticizing Homs’ theory 
of duty prediction. Holmes’s “bad man idea”, like 
Hart’s positivism, paid equal attention to the law as a 
justification for human behavior. And it also uses the 
inner point of view. Hart’s “cleverness” lies in the fact 
that he gave law a function from the point of view of 
theorists rather than practitioners. However, the biggest 
problem with this approach is that it fails in interpreting 
the normative aspects of law. To provide a full 
explanation of the normative nature of the law, theorists 
must give meaning to the law from the perspective 
of the participants, so that it leads to the result of the 
Dworkin-style internal hermeneutics. “Legal theory 
must incorporate an intrinsic view of the law, which is 
the view of the internal members or participants of the 
legal system, the descriptive legal theory, which is not a 
participant but an external observer, does not provide an 
appropriate explanation of this internal view. “ (Dworkin, 
1988, pp.13-14)
Then Perry came to the full conclusion of his 
descriptive jurisprudence: the most successful legal 
theory proved not to be purely descriptive and irrelevant, 
as Hart had argued. The legal theory must be normative 
or hermeneutic. But the law also has some inevitable 
attributes of non-normative and moral, and this multi-
methodology approach can bridge the tension between 
descriptive methodology and normative methodology in 
jurisprudence (Perry, 2009).
3 . T H E  T E N S I O N  B E T W E E N 
DESCRIPTIVE METHODOLOGY AND 
NORMATIVE METHODOLOGY 
The above criticism of descriptive methodology by the 
three representative scholars of normative methodology 
are enlightening. Our quest for the nature of the law 
cannot be separated from the value judgment of the 
importance of the law to us, which must be made from the 
perspective of the participants in legal practice to include 
and make understandable the belief of the participant, 
if not impossibility, but this is not the voice of the 
theorist themselves to present these beliefs and attitudes. 
Therefore, the legal theory which is constructed from 
the perspective of “understanding but not commitment” 
and “describing but not evaluating” is not a successful, 
reasonable and sincere legal theory. The legal theory 
should be based on description and aim at normativity.
Waldron has pointed out that not only is the law itself 
normative, but also the concept of law is normative, and it 
is impossible for one to use or understand it independently 
of its participation in a form of life, this form of life 
classifies political practice in different ways (Yin, 
2016). It is clear that the theory of descriptive law runs 
counter to this important view that our interpretation and 
understanding of legal practice shapes our legal concepts, 
the life of the concept lies in practice and life form. The 
answer to “what is the law” contains the value judgment 
of “what the law should be”, which cannot be separated 
decisively. As Dworkin put it to descriptive philosophical 
discourse, “an Archimedean approach is not going to 
work.” Dworkin points out that Hart’s position is a special 
case of the standard Archimedes idea. The methodological 
characteristic of Archimedes’ idea is that although the 
researcher thinks that although he studies a certain kind 
of social practice, he does not participate in it, and this 
methodology presupposes the same distinction together 
(Wang, 2013, p.196).
In my view, the legal theory must proceed from the 
internal angle of view and must be proved by resorting 
to moral judgment. The defense of the internal angle of 
view of the legal theory urges us to think deeply about 
the relationship between philosophy of law, political 
philosophy and moral philosophy, because a kind of legal 
theory based on the internal angle of view contains the 
normative proof dimension. It will inevitably force us 
to turn our attention to the field of political philosophy 
and moral philosophy, in which Dworkin is a firm and 
unhesitant actor; Raz and Finnis regarded philosophy of 
law as a branch of practical philosophy. This means that 
legal theory is not a self-sufficient field, and moral or 
political considerations play an indispensable role in the 
conceptual analysis of law. We cannot therefore think that 
the subordinate relationship between these disciplines 
has eliminated the unique position and contribution of 
philosophy of law. On the contrary, it is a disrespect for 
the objective rules if we in order to pursue the so-called 
independent disciplinary status and objective research 
perspective, so that deliberately separated the relevant 
factors. 
I also basically disagree with Dickson’s point of view, 
although she rightly pointed out that it is too simple to 
divide the legal theory into “normative jurisprudence” 
and “descriptive jurisprudence”. But she did not elaborate 
more clearly on why the judgment of importance was 
not moral. She did not explain why what was considered 
important by the general public was important, and why 
the nature of the evaluation criteria was not related to 
morality. Dickson’s methodology of defending descriptive 
theory based on indirect evaluation proposition is 
not a successful attempt. The author believes that the 
legal theory is essentially a normative theory of moral 
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evaluation, and this theory must also contain a description 
of the object of understanding and evaluation-the law. The 
evaluation basis of the law theory still comes from the 
people’s value idea of the essence of the law. Although the 
dispute over methodology is not meaningless, the debate 
about the substantive value of law is the core and the most 
important issue for legal people to pay attention to. When 
faced with questions such as “what should I do” and “what 
should we decide, execute, need, improve”, only when 
we have a clear understanding of the facts about how the 
world works can only be answered. Therefore a good 
theory of description, both special and general, is needed, 
but description is always secondary, and the primary 
concern is to choose a good reason for action for your 
judgment. “should” is not from “reality”, but only from 
some higher, ultimate premise of what should be.
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